Supreme Court Psychoanalysis

Ok this is my first real blog. My other posts' have so far been papers that i had written previously for school. Now I'll start writing what's on my mind.

First of all, I'd like to dabble in a brief psychoanalysis of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court's authority relies on a civic religion of Constitutionalism. Supreme Court Justices wear robes. They convene in a building designed to look like a Roman Temple.

Furthermore, beyond the ocular similarities, Justices consider themselves the final authority on questions of law and policy. They derive their peculiar teleology from the quasi-spiritual "We the People". Like God this entity is omnipresent and yet ultimately unidentifiable. Also, like in religious proceedings The Supreme Court speaks in strange tongues and uses an archaic language - latin - in order to mystify proceedings. Finally, Justices elicit the will of "The Founding Father's" to support their decisions. In determining questions of law Justices must summon spirits to explain to them the meaning of their holy text - the Constitution. Justices are modern shamans who apparently commune with the spirits of Jefferson, Madison and Lincoln in order to gain unique insight into American policy.

Now I am no conservative reactionary. Judicial shamanism is; therefore, disputing it is to dispute the entirety of the entire idea of US consensual government. You see, The Supreme Court has no explicit power. The only thing supporting its decisions in opposition to the President and Congress is the moral force of its words. The quasi-religious nature of the Supreme Court is an essential component of its institutional function, as a check against presidential and even Congressional or majoritarian tyranny. I support the Supreme Court. They function as the US's Platonic philosopher kings. The noble lie in this case is the story of the Founding Fathers and the idea of Universal Rights. The legitimacy of both the Founding Story and the idea of Universal Rights are highly contested, but regardless of their Truth, these stories are important in that they can be incorporated into social battles to heighten legitimacy. Both Lincoln and MLK invoked the principles of the Founding generation in their struggle to rearrange evil systems of control.

Now, having established that the Supreme Court (SC) is a religious institution with a claim to divine authority we can better understand why the SC uses an extremely low threshold when granting standing to plaintiffs who charge the state with violating the First Amendment's Establishment of Religion clause. As we have discussed, the state already has a civic religion. The establishment clause is a particularly sensitive issue for the SC, because they hold claim to a great deal of power due to the civic religion derived from the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. The tenets of this belief system include a focus on Reason (over irrationality), Universal Individual Rights, and the ideal of Freedom through Consensual Government. Any other religion that claims state support is - in a sense - a direct threat to the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Courts identity is rooted in the Supremacy of secular (and most importantly reasonable) institutions. The only stronger moral authority in the US may be its peculiar devotion (when compared to other Western nations) to religious organizations. Faith - the essentially irrational basis of all religions - threatens the Supreme Courts own preference for on Reason guided by founding principles.

The low threshold granted to those who want to challenge religious devotions can be accounted for not because the Supreme Court is anti-religious. On the contrary, they have espoused a religion and are merely using any opportunity they can to assert its supremacy over other religions. The same yearning for recognition that drives "Fundamentalist Christians" to gain state support for prayer in schools is, ironically, also fueling the Supreme Courts rejection of such non-secular invocations. (I use quotations because a true Fundamentalist is secure in their belief and does not want or need validation from the state. In fact the involvement of secular institutions waters down spiritual practice.) The SC's religion like all others demands an exclusive right to knowledge and is threatened by anyone who claims otherwise within the sphere of their control. They are insecure because the basis of their religion is really pretty and relies on at least a modicum of popular support - since they are constantly invoking the name of "We the People" in their defense. Therefore they must act with full moral force in asserting themselves as preeminent within the realm of governmental institutions.

The tables have turned on religious institutions. Whereas, the Catholic Church once used state power to censure the admittedly irrational and un-rigorous "science" of Galileo; now the Supreme Court removes from government the irrationality of religion. The prevailing theme which arises of course is that of the inevitability of irrationality - Reason can never be proven or even found only the modes of knowledge/power production have changed. Ironically, nowadays it is religion not Galileo's mad science which acts as a site of resistance to the prevailing knowledge production.

The people of the US can be said to be a bi-theistic people. On average they have two belief systems. First is the uniform set of secular beliefs of the Founding, and the second are their particularist religious beliefs. I personally think this is a cool tradition. This underlying tension between our two selves is a unique opportunity for USians to invision and contemplate pluralism. We are schizophrenic, we live in two realities. One foot in the secular world and one in the spiritual. I would not, If I were you, simply cast one half aside focusing wholly on the other. This will simplify your life; But if you are instead able to life in flux than this uneasiness created between the secular and the spiritual can enhance our perspective on life.

Yoo Vs. Fisher on Presidential War Powers

First, Fisher believes that original understanding of the constitution subordinates the President to Congress in matters of foreign affairs. “In a letter to Jefferson, Madison said that the Constitution ‘supposes, what the History of all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. Is the branch of power most interested in war, & most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl (p. 4).” Having recently fought a war with an imperialist England, the writers of the constitution were radically opposed to British model. In order to separate the power to declare war from the power to execute war, the founders created separate legislative and Executive branches – a radical innovation to the British parliamentary system. Therefore, Fisher construes the original intent of “the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect (p. 7).”
Yoo, on the other hand, believes the implied powers of the President as Commander in Chief actually give him superior footing in international relations. By the time of the framing of the constitution Americans had come to accept the enlightenment philosophers’ understanding of executive prerogative. James Madison’s stated before the Virginia ratifying convention: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist (p.89).” John Locke, the principal source of understanding of prerogative and federative power, believed both rightly belonged in the hands of the executive. In Federalist No. 70 we find Hamilton in agreement, “Decision, acitivity, secrecy and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number (p. 21). Furthermore – unlike other executive functions – the federative power was not considered bound by legislation. John Locke writes, “foreign affairs are not easily controlled by prior legislation, when the executive acts abroad it is not actually executing the law. Instead, the executive is leading [in a realm] governed only by the law of nature (p. 37 emphasis added).” Opposed to the Article I, Section i grant of Congressional power of only “those legislative powers ‘herein granted,’” the President is granted all the powers of the executive (p. 152). Therefore, the president is not limited in his exercise of his federative power.
A second area of contention is over the proper legal framework of Presidential war powers. Fisher further believes that constitutional law requires the President to procure a declaration of war or a Letter of Marque and Reprisal prior to engaging in any military operation (p. 7). Fisher’s textual analysis includes Jules Lobel’s conclusion that “the marquee and reprisal clause ‘probably was intended to cover all reprisals or uses of force against other nations short of declared war (p. 5).” The founders included this rather innocuous clause in order to ensure that all military action – no matter the size – would be controlled by Congressional authorization. The only exception Fisher makes to this rule is in the case of invasion (p. 3), because he cannot foresee of any other “danger” so “imminent” as to preclude a discussion in Congress (p. 19 & 211).
Yoo believes the President can activate hostilities without explicit authorization from Congress. The founders recognized such declarations as superfluous. Hamilton wrote that “the ceremony of a formal declaration of war has of late fallen into disuse (p. 123).” The prominent contemporary English legal scholar Blackstone wrote that the role of the declaration of war was “fundamentally one of defining legal relationships (p. 61).” Furthermore, the common definition of declare, then as now, supports Yoo’s interpretation. “Samuel Johnson’s English dictionary (perhaps the definitive dictionary at the time of the framing) defined ‘declare’ as ‘to clear, to free from obscurity’; ‘to proclaim’… (p. 145).” A clarification of the legal status between you and does not function as the beginning of an engagement – it is merely making the conflict known to all. Had the framers intended to limit Presidential war-making then they could have included the wording found in Article II, Section ii of the constitution which lays down the framework for approving executive treaties, e.g. “the President ‘shall have Power, by and with the advice and consent of Congress, to engage in War (p. 153 emphasis added).” The conspicuous absence of such wording, suggests that the Framers did not intend to a specific legal framework for going to war. “Rather,” writes Yoo, “in foreign affairs the constitution gave birth to a dynamic process in which each branch was given certain powers [to be used] to shape foreign policy (p. 17).”
Finally, Fisher and Yoo differ somewhat in their approach to treaty making. Fisher quotes Hamilton in Federalist No. 75: “the act of making treaties ‘will be found to partake more of the legislative than of the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of either of them (p. 5).” For Fisher, treaty-making is best controlled by Congress. When the President acts in pursuance of international law, without Congressional authorization, she is exceeding her constitutional authority. Clinton’s actions in Kosovo were not justified under Fisher’s framework (p. 185 – 187).
Yoo, on the other hand, believes treaty making to be a federative power that is overall best handled by the unitary executive (p. 38). Commercial treaties, under this framework, present a special exception in that they require much more legislative involvement (p. 40). According to Yoo the nature of the Senate supports this assertion, because it was not a wholly legislative institution, but in fact an executive/legislative hybrid (p. 24). Thus, for Yoo, Clinton’s interventions in Kosovo were a legitimate exercise of his Executive powers. Though, as with Fisher, Yoo does not hold that the President should be required to go to war as a result of international law, his reasoning differs a great deal.
Yoo is correct in asserting that institutional flexibility is necessary in dealing with rising globalization. Ironically, he looks for this flexibility in anachronistic models of international law – i.e. John Locke’s international state of nature. Flexibility is necessary so far as it empowers law makers and the executive to enforce international law, which is the essential element in stabilizing the rising global order. Furthermore, this seemingly extra-constitutional law must be binding to be effective. Fisher is correct, insofar, as he agrees with Jackson’s opinion that “The Presidents power is at its lowest ebb’ when he takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress (p. 265).” Essentially, Curtiss-Wright correctly established that “[t]he president might act in internal affairs without congressional authority, but not that [s]he might act contrary to an act of Congress.” Since both Fisher and Yoo agree that treaties are at least in part an act of legislation, then the basic understanding of the relationship between legislative and executive roles should control. Yoo resoundingly fails to create saliency with his constitutional foreign policy framework. Fisher does a slightly better job by requiring the executive to execute Congressional foreign policy directives.
Yoo’s textual analysis, however, trumps Fisher’s. Fisher is forced to awkwardly adopt the extra-constitutional Presidential power to “repel sudden attacks” in order to justify his framework. Without this extra-textual assertion, Fisher’s framework would render the President completely helpless in the face of an actual emergency (Yoo p. 159). This would be exactly the opposite of the Framer’s intentions. When they wrote the constitution, they set up a government specifically in order to deal with attacks – such as Shay’s rebellion – which threatened to throw the nation into disarray.
To a large degree the opinions in Hamdi vs. Rumsfeld support Fisher’s view of the proper structuring of US foreign policy. The plurality says that “detention of individuals falling into the category we’re considering is so fundamental and accepted… as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ authorized by the AUMF (p. 518)” The plurality shows some deference towards the implied powers of the executive branch – point Yoo – but by not directly addressing the question of Presidential power in the absence of Congressional authority, the plurality tacitly accepts Fisher’s understanding of Presidential war power only in cases of Congressional authorization. Secondly, all the justices, with the exception of Thomas, agree that the President does need Congressional authorization to indefinitely detain citizens. The inquiry naturally devolves, then, to whether the AUMF was properly authorized the suspension of habeas corpus rights. In response, even the somewhat conciliatory plurality concludes that the implied power of the executive does not provide sufficient legal ground for “perpetual detention” of Hamdi (p. 521). “We have long since made it clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens (p. 537).” This undermines somewhat Yoo’s assertion that the executive can use force without the authorization of Congress.
Finally, while Yoo would most likely disagree with the pluralities decision and side with Thomas, his philosophy is somewhat vindicated by the courts attempt to structure a dynamic tribunal policy somewhere between the competing interests of Congress and the Executive branch. Likewise, Scalia supports Yoo’s assertion that when in challenged the institutional framework is best upheld by Congress exercising its own institutional powers – rather than relying on quasi-legislative court decisions – to check against executive power (p. 577).

Kagan Vs. Porter on the question of American Nationalism and Expansionism

The principal explanations Robert Kagan provides in Dangerous Nation for the growth of America’s expansionist “mission” are those of enlightenment ideology, security and civilizationism.

In Colonial America the Lockean ideal of land ownership was an incredibly powerful force. “Land ownership equaled liberty, both in Lockean theory and practice (p. 15).” Smith and Burke commented on colonials extensive freedoms (p. 16). However, according to Kagan, the freedom which early colonial people enjoyed “depended on an endless supply of land on which to settle and start a new life (p. 16),” But this land was not empty. Spanish, French and Native Americans all shared the continent (p. 11 – 16). Despite their ever-pressing territorial expansion, “Anglo-Americans did not view themselves as aggressors… they believed it only right and natural that they should seek independence and fortune themselves and their families in the New World (p. 11).” Colonial Americans used fetishist disavowal as a means of justifying their quest for liberty.

These justifications became essential elements of the American “mission” of territorial expansion. First, the drive for land, ironically, led to the securitization of expansionistic policies. Native Americans, perceiving their territory slowly being eroded by colonial settlers often “struck back, both out of vengeance and in the hopes of convincing the settlers to halt their advance and retreat (p. 12).” The settler’s – constantly engaged in a dream-act of forgetting their own aggressive expansion – viewed the American Indians as an unreasonable threat to their security “and their own actions as aimed at establishing nothing more than a minimal level of security (p. 12).” Kagan refers to Catherine the Great who said, “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them (p. 12).” Thus, we have an early example of Americans engaging in aggressive preventative actions in order to produce “a level of security… that was, as Burke suggested, unheard of in Europe (p. 29).” The expansionistic war against England in 1812 for control of Canada offers one instance of such policy (p. 65).

The drive for territory at the expense of others, also contributed to American racism, or Kagan’s watered-down “civilizationism”: “Their civilization they believed was beneficial both for those who advanced it and for those upon whom it was advanced (p. 13).” This “civilizing” mission was used to justify the destruction of Native American culture, and the post-Spanish War annexation of Cuba (p. 413).

The Revolutionary War and the Declaration of Independence established a national identity based on the universal rights of man. Kagan agrees with William Appleman Williams that “Americans believe their nation ‘has meaning … only as it realizes natural right and reason troughout the universe’ (p. 42).” Thus, from the very point of conception, the US has felt a unique call to use its influence for the civilizing ends of republicanism and rights-based commercialism. The call to defend these ideals – or to defend the very essence of US identity would play heavily in US expansionism: during the North’s invasion of the South Lincoln invoked the spirit of the Declaration to remake the nation based on the ideals of the enlightenment (p. 265-271). Universal ideals also loomed large in William Mckinnley’s decision to go to war with Spain over Cuba’s Independence (p. 396 - 416). US civilizationism provides plenty of justifications for war.

In Kagan’s analysis even manifest destiny is subordinated to American civilizationism. Prior to the Civil war a great divide existed in the United States which precluded the existence of a single vision of manifest destiny. Instead there were to visions of American identity – two civilizations competing against each other for dominance. “Northerners embraced manifest destiny insofar as it meant the expansion of free territory. Southerners embraced it only when it meant the expansion of slave territory.” Only after the question of national identity had been settled by the Civil War – in favor of the commercialism of the North – would the US be able to again pursue its expansionist mission without anxiety over which version of civilization would be doing the advancing.

In Porter’s book “War and the American Government” he explains the rise of the American state as a by-product of nationalist wars. According to Porter the ethnic and cultural diversity of the several colonies was a weak base for state power (p. 246). Furthermore, to the extent that US Americans had any common sense of nationality it was their, inherently anti-statist and Revolutionary ideology (p. 247). The only thing uniting Americans have been their common enemies.

Americans first sense of national identity came as a result of war. Specifically the continental army marked the first instance of a large body of men from throughout the colonies uniting in a common cause: “Soldiers from different regions of the country viewed one another with suspicion or even animosity, but this changed as they camped, served and fought together. The war helped forge the first sense of a distinctive American nationality (p. 251).” The Revolution was not the last instance where war-time institutions created an increased sense of community. After witnessing first hand the devastating consequences of a disunited nation, US association with rebellion and anti-statism waned. Furthermore, according to Porter “By starkly demonstrating the power of government to bring about radical change, the war stimulated public awareness of the positive utility of American power (p. 265).” War thus did a great deal to change American identity, towards an identity of state-dependency and nationalism.

Furthermore the exigencies of war are directly linked to the expansion of state power. Wars are massive undertakings requiring lots of manpower equipment. Wars have provided the Federal government with “unprecedented authority to intervene in the national economy (p. 271).” Coercive agencies such as the IRS and the Federal Reserve (p. 270), and fiscal tools requisite to bureaucratic expansion such as the first federal income tax were instituted as means to effectively wage wars (p. 260) and have since become permanent appendages to the US state. Wars have a “ratcheting effect” (p. 295) where there is a large build up of Federal bureaucracy which never quite returns to pre-war levels. Once people (possibly in the shape of federal employees) become dependent upon the continued existence of a certain agency, it becomes intractable. Thus, not only was the political impetus for state expansion forged by wartime institutions, but the very institutional framework necessary for state expansion coalesced in response to national disaster.

Kagan’s emphasis on ideology as a driving force behind expansion obviously distinguishes him from the more institutionally minded Porter. Porter writes, “The tendency among historians in recent decades has been to view the American Revolution as primarily a process of intellectual and social change, and to minimize the importance of the War of Independence in the transformation that occurred (p. 248).” Porter would probably find Kagan somewhat guilty of overplaying the role of ideology on US institutions, while ignoring the other side of the coin – the effects of institutions change on ideology. Porters approach is preferable. “The war was not a mere epiphenomenon of the larger Revolution; it was its central event and a significant cause of its far-reaching social and political repercussions… War, not ideas alone, wrought the radical change in American opinion that Wood, Bailyn and [Kagan might be included in this list] have documented (p. 249).”

Kagan also differs from Porter in his rejection of US exceptionalism. He believes Americans have always been imperialists – lacking only the institutional strength to enforce their universal vision across the globe. Porter on the other hand accepts the idea of early US anti-statism and at least tacitly accepts early US anti-expansionism. The threat of outside forces was necessary to convince people to accept the institutions of state power necessary for territorial expansion. “In the six decades preceding the Civil War, the United States remained wedded to the Jeffersonian vision that at its core was both antimilitary and anti-state (p. 255).” The Civil War instigated the shift in dominant US ideology towards the state-based Hamiltonian vision of America.

Kagan and Porter continue to be in disagreement about the post-Civil War period. Porter opposes Kagan’s belief in the victory of rights-based commercial ideology after the Civil war. According to Porter communitarianism was actually coming quite into vogue: the first efforts at welfare programs such as the Freedman’s Bureau and the veteran’s assistance programs occurred during the post-Civil War Reconstruction period and these foreshadowed the socialist reforms of the New Deal (p. 265 - 266). War necessity and institutional self-interest explain the changes which occurred during this period – not a single (uncomplicated) ideology of commercialism and universal rights.

The cracks in Kagan’s thesis appear when, in his attempts to advocate a consistent ideological approach, Kagan is forced to paper over the differences in US ideology during the post-civil war period: mixing natural rights based philosophy with a historicist tradition which is quite at odds with enlightenment constitutionalism (p. 295). Ideology lacks force; instead, institutional changes are the key to understanding US Foreign Policy.

Hamilton's Nationalist Economics

While familiar with liberal ideology of limited government intervention it is notable that Hamilton – like Smith – did not expect free commerce to erase dangers to the United States in the international arena. Contrary to liberal thinkers such as Montesquieu, Hamilton believed that “commerce was [actually] more likely to be the cause of recurring wars” (p. 240) He asks “Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory?” (p.240). Therefore, Hamilton advocated a balance between liberal economic theory and mercantilist realities. Essentially, free-commerce between the states would be used to ensure healthy domestic trade; while protectionist policies would be used to ensure that the infantile manufacturing capabilities of the US could develop without being put out of business by state sponsored monopolies existing in Great Britain and other mercantilist nations (p. 234). Hamilton says, “To maintain, between the recent establishments of one country, and the long matured establishments of another country, a competition upon equal terms… is in most cases impracticable" (p. 234). Hamilton wanted to create an insular economic cocoon from within which the US economy could develop until it was ready to emerge a great and powerful nation, because for Hamilton as Smith the key to a powerful military nation was a strong economy capable of producing heaps of consumables goods (p. 229). Furthermore, by using economic policies to protect citizens’ interests, Hamilton hoped to foster national unity and love of country.

Hamilton also hoped this economic policy would foster national unity through trade. Rather than trading overseas, Hamilton expected the manufacturing North and the agricultural South to become interdependent. The South could market its raw materials to the North, and The West would serve as a market for the both; and overall the nation’s productive capabilities would grow aggrandizing national strength (p.235). Earle writes, “The aggregate strength of a nation thus united by a common economic interest would be increased in every essential respect” (p. 235). With national unity there comes an advantage in foreign relations and military readiness, because people have a shared stake in the success of every of the country – as opposed to just their region (p. 235). Also regional economic diversity strengthened the war-making capabilities of the country. In these ways, economic policy was considered key to military policy.

Hamilton even went so far as to advocate the illiberal idea of government control of manufacturing, in order to build “essential implements of national defense… not being objects of ordinary and indispensible private consumption or use (p. 234).” Market forces of supply and demand don’t work for war materials. The government must do its all to ensure production so that the US would not fall behind its competitors in military technology.

However, for Hamilton the real danger was not external, but internal. If citizens relied primarily on other nations for economic stability and were largely responsible for their own defense, cross-regional disunity and distrust would be sure to foment. Hamilton’s economic policy aimed at creating “an exemption from the necessary broils and wars between the [several] parts, which if disunited, their own rivalships, fomented by foreign intrigue… would inevitably produce (p. 235).” Thus, Hamilton, following the political theories of Machiavelli, believed the national government must rely on its “own arms” for production of defense materials. Hamilton says “As a general rule, manufactories on the immediate account of government are to be avoided; but this seems to be one of the few exceptions which that rule admits.” Hamilton believed that the US had to take it upon itself to the care of military readiness to ensure that lack of security would not constantly undermine US liberty (p. 235); thereby linking political economy with the development of national military power.

Hamilton justification for the assumption of the national debt is a similar attempt to promote national strength through economic policy. Hamilton wanted to ensure that the US was not perceived as a bad investment in the future by faithfully executing all debts – domestic and foreign. For Hamilton, establishing and keeping good national credit was critical to security (p. 237). He writes, “war, without credit, would be more than a great calamity – [it] would be ruin” (p. 237). Fulfillment of the Revolutionary debt is thus an example of the connection between economic policy and commerce with the development of national power. In order to protect the nation and effectively wage war Hamilton relied on sound economic policy.

While security was a significant concern, by assuming the several states debt Hamilton also believed he would be linking “the interests of the State in an intimate connection with those of the rich individuals belonging to it,” and turning “the wealth and influence of both into a commercial channel, for mutual benefit (p.237).” In other words, if the US owes you money, then you’re going to have a real strong incentive to ensure that it doesn’t tank, because that would render you’re investment worthless. Faithfully, executing these fiscal agreements gave people a real stake in the success of the Federal government. Thus, Hamilton sought to increase national unity.

The creation of a navy for Hamilton is another example of policy aimed at promoting national unity, independence and security. A navy, a source of national power – which opponents such as Jefferson feared would give the Federal government too much power in peace time – was according to Hamilton essential to the success of US commerce. Hamilton believed secure waters were essential to commerce both among the states and among nations. He was confident that this point was well accepted: “The necessity of naval protection to external or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation (p. 237).” By establishing a navy Hamilton hoped to give the US independence from other nations who might seek to interfere in her affairs. Furthermore, like his policy of protectionism, a strong naval policy which guarantees protection to US citizens would help unite the US creates safe channels for trade he hoped to further unite the disparate regions of the country through intercourse and trade.

Also Hamilton’s advocacy for the Navy evinces the reciprocal relationship between commerce and defense. Commerce is key to defense, the byproduct of a strong national defense is security, which is itself key to successful commerce. Thus the two constantly reinforce one another.

In Washington’s farewell address – authored in part by Hamilton – several of the elements of Hamilton’s political philosophy are discussed. The first of these is the idea of the value of energetic government used to unite and protect. “This government… completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with energy… has just claim to your confidence and support (p. 518).” Washington supports Hamilton in his attempts to secure the country both from both physical violence and from the structural violence of mercantilism. The Federal government is the perfect entity to perform this function because it can rise above local issues and serve the common interest of the nation as a whole. Washington would limit the “vigour” of the national government just as much “is consistent with Liberty” (p. 519). However we soon learn that at the time of writing this address, this implied expansion rather than limiting, because “Liberty itself will find in such a [vigorous] Government, with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest Gaurdian (p. 519).” The bigger the national government the more effectively it can protect peoples rights and liberties. Unlike Jefferson, Washington feared the national government would be too “feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction, confine each member of the Society within the limits prescribed by the laws and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property (p. 519).”

A second element of Hamilton’s economic philosophy espoused by Washington in his farewell address is the assumption of state war debt. First Washington says “As the structure of government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened (p. 522).” This statement is Washington’s segue way into his discussion of public credit. Clearly he means to enlighten us. He says “As a very important source of security, cherish public credit (p. 525).” In order to cherish credit, one must honor one’s obligations. Washington, not so subtly, calls upon the nation to see reason and support a not-so-popular policy. He appeals to the common interest of security – just as Hamilton would.

Finally, Washington speaks out against geographic discriminations in economic policy. He says, “Designing men may endeavor to excite a belief that there is a real difference of local interests and views (p. 519).” Washington encourages them to continue in free intercourse with one another and to avoid “the insidious wiles of foreign influence” (p. 524); thereby, encouraging – as Hamilton would – national unity and independence.

Violence in 3 Novels

By Zach Myers

Zizek classifies violence into two categories: subjective and objective. Subjective violence is our typical and therefore “subjective” experience of violence against the background of a non-violent zero level (Violence, p. 2). Subjective violence “is seen as a perturbation of the ‘normal’ state of things. However, Objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this ‘normal’ state of things (Violence, p. 2).” Subjective violence is, from our personal perspective, the “irrational” violence on TV and the news. It is, for instance, the suicide of Danny Taylor in Winter of Our Discontent, along with the rape of John Trueblood’s daughter and the rioting in Harlem in Invisible Man. This violence seems absurd and impossibly misdirected to someone who doesn’t understand the structural violence inherent in the system. “Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent (Violence, p.2 emphasis added).”

A dialogue about a riot in the Ellison’s Invisible Man aptly describes the difference in experience between someone who recognizes the connection between subjective and objective violence, and someone who does not:

“’This is some night,’ one of them said. ‘Ain’t this some night?’

‘It’s about like the rest.’

‘Why you say that?’

‘ ’Cause it’s fulla fucking and fighting and drinking and lying – gimme that bottle.’” (p. 561)

To most the riot is an instance experienced as violence – which it is. But only the most attuned to violence recognize it as a single performative manifestation of and underlying system.

Objective violence is the smoothly operating machine on the body of the criminal in Kafka’s In the Penal Colony. Through punishment, his crimes are inscribed and encoded in such a way that they literally become a part of him (p. 197). “It can’t be a simple script of course, after all, it’s not supposed to kill right away (p. 204).” The machine does not kill quickly. It is drawn out for the performative aspect of punishment. In other words, the machine must work slowly, in order to bring about the performance from the subject that codifies his socio-symbolic identity:

“It’s planned for an average of twelve hours; the climax is calculated for the sixth hour… And how quiet the man becomes at the sixth hour! Even the stupidest man is now enlightened. It starts around his eyes. From there it spreads out. A look that might lure you into joining him under the harrow… the man begins to decipher the writing… You’ve seen that it is not easy to decipher the script with your eyes; but our man deciphers it with his wounds.” (p. 204)

The punishment is reflexively justified by the criminal’s reaction to it. Like the machinations of the apparatus, systemic violence not only hurts the person physically, but through performance transforms her or him into their role as an Other.

For example John Trueblood was born a share-cropper. His socio-symbolic identity as a black man, reinforced by the structural violence of the contemporary economic system, prevented him from attaining basic necessities such as warmth. Through continual nudging – economic deprivations and symbolic reinforcements – he eventually performed the violent degradation pushed on him by raping his own daughter – an instance of subjective violence against the background of objective violence. This performative act, like the look of sickening transfiguration on the face of the accused, reflexively justified his punishment - or the objective violence of economic degradation.

Ethan Hawley in Winter of Our Discontent is aware of the disparate economic, social and symbolic pressure nodes which “in concentration had been nudging [] and altogether amounted to a push (WOTD, p. 88).” Instead of directly hurting people structural violence relies on hundreds and thousands of seemingly innocent actions which resonate together to destroy. The “push” Ethan describes is the final culmination in subjective violence. It is the final straw performative act in which Danny kills himself. On the subject of violence, Ethan asks, “Is murder by slow, steady pressure any less murder than a quick and merciful knife thrust? (p. ?)” In fact structural violence is more sinister because it takes away the subjects dignity, as well as their life, in order to justify and continually perpetuate violence against them. As the protagonist in the Invisible Man puts it, “They want you guilty of your own murder (p. 558).”

Structural violence – evictions, unequal job opportunities, racism, etc. – all resonated together and created the violence embodied by “Ras the destroyer (p. 558)” in Ellison’s Invisible Man. The Brotherhood watched this steady build of injustices and did nothing, constantly advocating waiting for some specific moment – were these “scientists” waiting for the return of Christ? There is no logic behind their inaction except to perpetuate the systemic violence which is the source of “the energy” that they feel they are destined to direct. When Harlem finally rejects the Brotherhood, they had created a situation where all that had to be done to destroy her was for the “benevolent” Brotherhood to desert her, washing their hands of her death. The riot, thus functioned for the Brotherhood as a great ‘I told you so’ – a punishment which reflexively reinforces the Brotherhoods (right)eousness by bringing out the violence of Ras – who was in fact their own creation. And again, this also reflexively justifies further structural violence by justifying police brutality against the community in the future – Harlem has performed and entrenched the stigma of black criminality.

Because this symbolic violence is used to sustain the smooth operation of the systemic violence, Objective violence can often only be recognized by outsiders, such as the foreigner in the Penal Colony, who have a different zero-level from which to compare particular instances of violence. This normalizing renders the violence of the prisoner non-violence – part of the background of everyday experience. Ethan Hawley also recognized the objective violence in Danny Taylor’s death, when others did not. For them Danny was simply performing his role as a drunkard. Zizek writes, “Systemic violence is thus something like the notorious ‘dark matter’ of physics, the counterpart to an all-too-visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be ‘irrational’ explosions of subjective violence (Violence, p.2).” As we have thus far seen, the performative aspect of objective violence often serves to cover-up the deeper source of objective violence; it is ironic therefore, that according to Zizek the only way which we detect objective violence is through the seemingly irrational outbursts of subjective violence. However, in the literature this does seem to hold true.

The rape of John Trueblood’s daughter in Invisible Man made Norton suddenly aware of that there was something awful working away within the college community. Likewise, the riots in Harlem shocked the sensibilities of the protagonist; however, unlike Norton, even though he is not happy with the effects of subjective violence, the protagonist recognizes the underlying problems at the heart of the violence. In fact the riot helps the protagonist to more clearly understand the operation of the structural and symbolic violence committed against Harlem. He states, “I could see it now, see it clearly and in growing magnitude (p. 553).” In the midst of this stunning realization the protagonist is even willing to accept his own death – an act of subjective violence – if it might it might have the effect of awakening people to the “beautiful absurdity of their American identity (p. 559).” An outburst of subjective violence is inherently shocking because it is outside the norm. The protagonist hopes this shock will force people to reflect on the possible causes of violence. Thus, even though Ras is playing into the hands of his oppressor by performing the very stigma which justifies his exclusion, there is also a hope that his action will expose the violence occurring everyday in Harlem; and thereby force people out of their comfort zones to confront the problems facing America.